As I have shown in Chapter 2, foreign exchange accumulation by EMEs has been highly conducive to supporting the macroeconomic autonomy of the United States to adopt a financed-led growth regime. China, which had amassed more than US$3.3 trillion in reserve assets by the end of 2012, accumulated reserves on an unprecedented scale over the past decade. China became increasingly vulnerable to external monetary developments as a result of its extraordinary foreign exchange accumulation: not only was the balance sheet of the People's Bank of China (PBoC) increasingly exposed to an exchange rate appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar; these reserves also reflect an excessive export orientation of the Chinese economy that made it increasingly vulnerable to a downfall in global demand. Why did China accumulate so many reserves that seem to have increased its external monetary vulnerability? By arguing that these reserves have strengthened the macroeconomic autonomy of China to adopt an export-led growth regime, the prevailing interpretation among scholars of IPE appears to be that the benefits of foreign exchange accumulation have exceeded the costs. While these scholars have also drawn attention to the presence of external constraints on the pursuit of China's monetary power, they have usually narrowed down their argument to the claim that its currency policy has been shaped by its desire to maintain the value of its foreign exchange reserves and to support the competitiveness of its export sector -a claim that follows from Jonathan Kirshner's concept of "entrapment" (Kirshner 1995) . A corollary is that these scholars have effectively uncovered the constraints on China's capacity to use its dollar reserves as an instrument of international financial influence, yet that its macroeconomic policy autonomy is considered to have substantially strengthened as a result of its reserve accumulation and international creditor status.
In this chapter, I show that a more thorough analysis of China's model of capitalism and growth regime allows an understanding of the entrapment of China's international monetary power that also challenges the notion of strengthened macroeconomic autonomy resulting from reserve accumulation: the difficulty to adjust its unsustainable growth regime -despite the resulting excessive export dependency of the Chinese economy and the desire of Chinese authorities to rebalance growth -can be seen as a clear manifestation of the constraints on its macroeconomic autonomy. I highlight two critical dimensions of the Chinese SME that are necessary for understanding these constraints: (1) the persistent importance of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector in the domestic political economy; and (2) the importance of domestic fixed-asset investment in its growth regime. Although existing accounts of China's monetary power have claimed that its growth regime is export-led, I highlight that it is first and foremost investment-led: the contribution of fixed-asset investment to its GDP growth has been consistently greater than the contribution of exports. Moreover, a more extensive understanding of the entrapment of Chinese monetary power needs to take into account that its export sector is largely private and foreign-owned while investment is a favorite SOE activity. As I will argue in this chapter, rising foreign exchange accumulation has strengthened the influence of the SOE sector by entrenching an unsustainable investment-led growth regime in the Chinese domestic political economy in ways that constrained the macroeconomic policy autonomy of Chinese authorities to rebalance growth.
By drawing attention to the importance of SOEs and their domestic fixed-asset investments in China's model of capitalism and growth regime, I claim that it is necessary to shift the analysis of its monetary power from the external imbalance of its growth regime -the discrepancy between its exports and imports -toward the internal imbalance -the discrepancy between investment and consumption. China's external monetary dependence, which must be conceived as its reliance upon export surpluses and its need to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, derived from a growing gap between fixed-asset investment and private consumption that for a large part reflects a redistribution of income from the household sector to the SOE sector. More particularly, I will uncover the growing interests of the SOE sector in foreign exchange accumulation by setting out a mutually reinforcing dynamic between China's external monetary dependence and the internal financial repression of its state-owned banking system. This dynamic has been based on the following three mechanisms.
